


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UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY



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~~TOP SECRET~~

INSTRUCTOR TRAINING DIVISION
GENERAL INSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
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MILITARY MONOGRAPH

TITLE: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY

SCOPE: This paper is intended to present a general understanding and appreciation of the United States Constabulary from the operational point of view. Administration and supply are touched upon only as deemed necessary to explain or elaborate upon operations proper. The discussion is divided into four major parts; 1) the background or planning period; 2) the mission; 3) the organization; and 4) the operational peculiarities. In so dividing the discussion or explanation, it is intended to portray a practical, working knowledge of the Constabulary operations in the United States Zone of Occupation (Germany).

Prepared by: Merle L. Carey

Major Cavalry

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY

"BAMBERG (GERMANY) 1 July 1946:- The wartime phrase 'routine patrols' was heard again this morning as the United States Constabulary reported on its first night of operation after taking over the border and interior patrols of United States Occupied Germany at 0001 today." ¹

Unlike Topsy, the United States Constabulary did not merely grow; rather, it was sired by the War Department and Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater; then foaled by Headquarters Third US Army and Major General Ernest N. Harmon's Constabulary Planning Group. Constabulary, the offspring, was formed to satisfy the existing need for an efficient type of permanent occupational force in Germany.

As such, the United States Constabulary presents a rather unique type of organization, previously unknown to the United States Army. The Constabulary mission is one of peace, not of war. The Constabulary code is "mobility, vigilance, justice", not destruction. Constabulary offers one of the most active fields for military service, especially well suited for armored personnel. Furthermore, it offers troop duty demanding initiative and ingenuity not only for the officer, but for the private soldier as well. Moreover, in a world of international doubt and friction, it seems only logical that the military should realize and understand the operational capacities and procedures of the Constabulary, our

guardian of the peace in Germany as well as our probable defensive line initially should an emergency arise in Europe. Hence, an understanding of the United States Constabulary is of definite interest and concern to the military both personally and professionally. As Abraham Lincoln said, "If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

It is not the purpose or intent of this paper to portray in minute detail the entire history of the United States Constabulary. Rather, it is intended to present a general understanding and appreciation of the Constabulary from the operational point of view. Because of this narrow approach, administration and supply will be touched upon only as deemed necessary to explain or elaborate upon operational points. Hence, it is not meant in any way to subordinate administration and supply, but rather to trace highlights of the Constabulary operational thread. Consequently, by depicting the planning, by delineating the mission, and then by concentrating on the peculiarities of both the organizational structure and the operations proper, it is intended to portray a working knowledge and understanding of the United States Constabulary from the operations officer's viewpoint.

To understand the United States Constabulary and its peculiarities in particular, it is important first of all to appreciate the Army's immediate post-war problems and the general planning

which developed the Constabulary theme. On 8 May 1945 the Allied world was at long last relieved to learn that the European phase of World War II was over: Germany had capitulated. However, now the defeated Germany must be occupied and governed. Thus, the United States Army along with the other Allied Armies was faced with the immediate problem of organizing and establishing military forces to support military government in the occupation zones. The redeployment of units and personnel to the Pacific war, the inactivation of surplus units and the large scale demobilization program demanded by the American public had thrown the United States Army into a turmoil. Nevertheless, to safeguard the peace in Europe it was considered essential that the occupation of Germany, effective immediately, be instituted and successfully accomplished over a period of years. Hence, until a permanent type occupation force could be organized and established operationally, the United States Army was forced temporarily to employ available combat units on occupation duty.

Therefore, while the American people were clamoring for the Army to release their Johnny and Harry to civilian life, the War Department, Headquarters United States Forces European Theater, and other subordinate headquarters in Europe studied the problem of a permanent occupation force for Germany. As far back as November 1944 the Fifteenth US Army had undertaken the study of occupational requirements and the method of employment of such units in so far

as the Rhineland was concerned. Likewise, upon termination of the war combat divisions assigned to occupational duty learned by experience that modifications to their present Tables of Organization and Equipment were necessary for this new type of assignment.² In September 1945 Hq USFET developed the idea of employing cavalry type units under a District Constabulary program designed to reduce the number of troops, and yet, by means of their mobility, to secure the occupation in Germany.³ Then on 3 October 1945 the War Department cabled Hq USFET, requesting comments on a proposed police type organization planned for occupational use in the Pacific area.⁴ In reply, Hq USFET pointed out that local conditions encountered in Europe would require modifications to the Pacific proposal, owing to such factors as the constant fluctuation of displaced persons and refugee populations, the state of the German civil government and the quadripartite division of Germany.⁵ In spite of the fact that the War Department already recognized the necessity for tailoring units to meet circumstances peculiar to the various theaters and had no intention of applying one type organization throughout, the preceding correspondence was significant in that it accelerated and crystallized the planning of Hq USFET toward a permanent police type organization.⁶

More or less as a practical operational test of the proposed police type unit, on 31 October 1945 Hq USFET directed both Third and Seventh US Armies to establish a District Constabulary in each of

their Army areas, employing presently assigned mechanized cavalry units.⁷ As it later turned out, these two District Constabulary organizations served not only as test units on which to base manpower and equipment estimates, but also as excellent initial guides for operational procedures of the future permanent force.

At this time it might be of interest to bring out some of the major points considered by Hq USFET in its planning for a permanent occupation force. It was realized that the police type force envisioned would not be capable of combat operations to any extent; hence, it was assumed that such a force would not be expected to engage in tactical operations outside the United States Zone. A major consideration in the peacetime American Army was the economy offered by the police type organization. Another thought was that the new type occupational force be projected for an operational date of 1 July 1946 to coincide with the partial reorganization of the United States Military Government planned for that time as well as with the strengthened capacity of the German government expected by that date.⁸ Early thoughts on the employment of this new force embodied each subordinate unit's patrolling a fixed area, prepared to support its neighboring units by virtue of its rapid mobility; furthermore, that each unit be expected to coordinate its activities with the local military government offices. As an overall mobile reserve for the future police organization in event of any major emergency,

Hq USFET estimated that three combat divisions should be concentrated by regiment at selected tactical location.⁹ However personnel shortages later precluded this. Other points considered in this planning phase included the possibility of using foreign nationals (later rejected as unsound), the pre-operational training of assigned units, the specific delineation of the force's mission, the importance of an efficient communications system, and the general importance of designing the future organization to meet those conditions peculiar to the occupation of Germany.¹⁰

The culmination of the early planning phase came on 22 December 1945: Hq USFET forwarded its occupation plan to the War Department. Specifically, the plan included the following salient features: 1) that the permanent force be an elite organization composed of the highest type personnel; 2) that it be assigned the mission of general security and support of United States policy in Germany; 3) that it employ an active patrol system to accomplish its mission; 4) that it cooperate with local German law-enforcement agencies through the local military government; 5) that its organization generally follow that of the mechanized cavalry unit, with desired modifications permissible; 6) that its major organic headquarters be located so as to take full advantage of the existing German communications nets; 7) that this new police type force, to be known as the Constabulary, could in all probability become operational on 1 July 1946; and 8) that

this Constabulary force be backed up by a mobile reserve composed of three combat divisions.¹¹ This plan was significant in that it pointed out decisively and specifically the fundamentals of the future permanent occupational force, the United States Constabulary.

Now that its plan was firm, Hq USFET entrusted the implementation and leg-work to Third US Army, inasmuch as the final theater reorganization scheduled Seventh US Army for return to the Zone of Interior. With the designation of Major General E. N. Harmon as Commanding General, United States Constabulary, on 10 January 1946, the Constabulary took its first physical step toward reality. It is to be noted at this time that Hq USFET deliberately provided General Harmon only that information deemed essential for a broad understanding of the proposed Constabulary in order that he might exercise his own initiative and ingenuity in forming details around the basic USFET plan.¹² Without delay General Harmon selected a Constabulary Planning Group to work out the details of organization and operational methods. This was speedily done and finally on 7 February 1946 General McNarney, European Theater Commander, approved and forwarded to the War Department this group's recommended Constabulary Tables of Organization and Equipment.¹³ However, there were still major tasks confronting the Constabulary Planning Group: training programs and cadres had to be established; assigned units had to

be received and located; logistical support had to be arranged; and a Constabulary School had to be instituted. However, in spite of such major problems as obtaining the units assigned and their desired locations, the tremendous redeployment of personnel, the dearth of expected high type personnel and the overall logistical difficulties, General Harmon whipped his newly organized Constabulary into action on 1 July 1946 as scheduled.¹⁴ The planning proper was over. The Constabulary, garbed in fancy uniforms, had stepped off the planning board to safeguard the peace in the United States Zone of Occupation (Germany).

Now that we have briefly traced the post-war situation and the planning phase of the Constabulary, let us briefly look at its mission and then turn our attention to the peculiarities of its organizational structure. To delineate the mission of the Constabulary is tantamount to saying that the Commanding General, United States Constabulary was generally responsible for the overall security program throughout the occupation zone. In just about every phase of occupational work, there was some trace of Constabulary coordination and planning so that action might be taken without delay to assure the security of American interests. Specifically, the Constabulary Commander was charged with the following throughout the United States Zone of Occupation (Germany):

- 1) to maintain general military and civil security;
- 2) to assist in accomplishing the goals of the United States Government by

employing an active patrol system capable of taking quick and decisive action against acts prejudicial to the security of United States forces and policies; 3) to maintain effective military control over all borders of the Zone.¹⁵

Therefore, it can be seen that the Constabulary was a large-scale police organization operating under the European Theater Commander to secure the Zone and to enforce the occupational policies promulgated by military government. The Constabulary was not expected to operate primarily as a tactical, combat force. Only in emergencies was it anticipated that the Constabulary might possibly operate outside the United States Zone, and then solely to secure American interests temporarily. In the words of Major General Harmon, father of the Constabulary, the mission was: "Policing the entire American Zone and supporting Military Government within the Zone".¹⁶ However, such a mission involved a multitude of jobs and tasks, each one of which formed a vital link in the overall security chain.

Now the question of organization crops up. Just what tools did the Constabulary Commander have at his disposal to execute his mission? Perhaps as simple a method as any to clarify this point fully is first to discuss some of the fundamental concepts proposed by higher headquarters; secondly to consider the local operational conditions anticipated in Germany; thirdly to examine some of the occupational lessons learned by

Constabulary's predecessors; and lastly to analyze briefly the major units of the Constabulary Table of Organization. In this way it is believed that a better understanding of the "why's" and "how's", as well as a more comprehensive appreciation of peculiarities of structure, will result.

As a result of the initial planning by various headquarters and boards, three fundamental concepts were decided upon for whatever final form the United States Constabulary Table of Organization might take: 1) maximum economy was essential; 2) the force was to be of the police type; 3) the mechanized cavalry organization was generally the pattern desired. In other words, the War Department felt that a police type unit organized somewhat along State Police lines would accomplish the mission most efficiently and economically. The Army was already being decimated by demobilization and redeployment so that the personnel problem was critical. Furthermore, the traditional American policy of rigid economy by the Armed Forces during peacetime had to be taken into consideration. Hence, to foster this economy, Hq USFET established by estimation a norm whereby Constabulary personnel requirements would be based upon one trooper per 450 Germans, or similarly, that one Constabulary troop of approximately 140 men would patrol approximately 225 sq miles.¹⁷

Because of the peculiar type mission, higher headquarters was firm in its belief that the police type of organization be

adopted. The mission was not considered suitable to existing combat organizations. Furthermore, it was felt that the American State Police or State Constabulary idea of organization would blend in nicely with the economy program. Again resorting to estimation, Hq USFET calculated that 281,000 troops could accomplish the occupational duties under a police type force, whereas approximately 363,000 troops would be required under the combat type.¹⁸ Another point which had led to the decision on a police type force was the belief that the 1945-46 winter would in all likelihood be the most rigorous period of occupation, after which the German people would have assumed at least some stability and quiescence. Furthermore, there was no reason at that time to believe that the other Allied Powers occupying Germany would not cooperate in maintaining law and order in their own respective areas. Therefore, the Constabulary's mission was mainly one of law and order within the United States Zone without anticipated reference to actual combat. Hence, the police type force seemed sound and well established.

Mobility, multiple communications, flexibility and independent operations over a wide frontage -- inherent characteristics of the cavalry type organization -- rendered the cavalry organization a good, sound basis for policing an area the size of the United States Zone. Heavy armor was not considered necessary to enforce American policies in defeated Germany, and as such would

not be economical. Neither was the vehicle-lacking infantry considered economical or appropriate to the peculiar mission at hand. Hence, it was decided to adopt an organization based upon mechanized cavalry lines, but modified as desired by the Constabulary Commander to accomplish his assigned mission.

Early in the planning stage, it was considered essential to the success of the occupation that the military personnel assigned to duty with the permanent occupational force be of the highest type possible, namely elite personnel operating in an elite force to best represent the United States abroad.¹⁹ It was visualized that the individual soldier on the ground would be in daily contact with the German people; that enlisted personnel frequently would be required to operate on their own away from officer supervision; and that, all in all, the judgment and common sense of the non-commissioned officer and enlisted man must be of the highest type possible. Hence, to induce high-type personnel and to encourage re-enlistments of desirable personnel, a higher proportion of grades and ratings was authorized. Accordingly, Hq USFET published qualifications desired in the future Constabulary trooper, listing high standards for physical, mental and nervous, and moral characteristics desired.²⁰

In addition to these fundamental concepts, the organization was influenced by certain local operational conditions as anticipated for occupation duties. First of all, inasmuch as the

Constabulary was intended to support military government, it was felt that the Constabulary organization should conform as closely as possible to the overall military government set up in the field. Military government had decided it most expedient to base its establishment on the existing German political sub-divisions such as Lander and Kreise in order to prevent unnecessary confusion among the indigenous populace in the transaction of government. Hence, there was a direct need for a major Constabulary unit either at or close to the capital of each of the three major German political sub-divisions in the Zone, namely the Lander of Greater Hesse, Bavaria, and Wurttemberg-Baden. Following this trend of thought, it was proposed that this pattern be generally closely adhered to down to the smallest Constabulary unit so that close coordination on the ground might be enhanced as far as possible. However, needless to say, one of the major difficulties to strict adherence to this proposal was the lack of suitable housing for the Constabulary units (according to the established standard of living for American troops in Europe) in many of the more prominent political centers such as KASSEL, MUNICH, WURZBURG, NURNBURG, and FRANKFURT.

A second condition indicated was that Constabulary units would have to be widely spread, down to and including as small a military unit as a section, if the entire Zone was to be patrolled and generally secured. Moreover, for maximum economy and efficiency

of operations, the planning groups decided that units would in general have to be located in or close to their particular areas of responsibility. This thought was implemented by the fact that patrolling would be of primary consideration initially in order to make the German people feel the military strength backing up the proclamations and edicts of military government.

Still another condition indicated locally was the necessity for enforcing policies concerning zonal borders, inasmuch as the partition of Germany had effected new geographical borders of which the German people were either unaware or reluctant to respect. Thus, enforcement of border regulations required stationing troops both at and along the various borders which generally paid no heed to the limitations of the wheeled vehicle. Hence, there was introduced the need for the horse and the dismounted soldier to patrol along such places as the Black Forest, the Austrian Alps and the Bohmer Wald.

Then again, a most important consideration in successfully operating police-type troops among a foreign populace was that each trooper be thoroughly versed in his duties and authority. This was no easy task. The multiple ramifications of the trooper's job made him not only a soldier, but a patrol-policeman with numerous German and American forms to complete; a desk-sergeant with the job of processing and acting on these forms; an ambassador of American democracy among the German populace; a customs inspector

when on border duty; an intelligence agent seeking out subversive elements at all times. Then, among other requirements, was that of understanding the basic fundamentals of military government so that the trooper could render justice tempered with good judgment and common sense. Hence, one of the first things that General Harmon sought in his final organization was a special Constabulary school where the future trooper might be taught those subjects essential to successful completion of his occupational duties and also where he might be imbued with esprit de corps for his new outfit. Actually this Constabulary School (at Sonthofen) played a most important and influential role in moulding the soldier into the Constabulary trooper.²¹

Now let us look at some of the lessons learned by Constabulary's predecessors, those units which had initially assumed temporary occupational duties. One of the first indications was that indigenous personnel could be employed as helpers in the messes, motor pools, supply and service installations, thereby reducing noticeably the number of American personnel devoted to administrative and supply duties. This point was important from the maximum economy view, in that it freed more troops for actual operational duties. Another lesson pointed out was the impracticability of dividing the Zone into areas of responsibility without close control and supervision. If operational procedures and policies were to be executed throughout the entire Zone without local interpretations

and variances, control was essential. This was brought out during the periods that the combat divisions and the District Constabulary units functioned under two different area headquarters, Third and Seventh US Armies. Hence, in the permanent organization it was considered wise to have one superior Headquarters, United States Constabulary as the overall controlling and coordinating agency for the Constabulary in the entire Zone.

In the light of these fundamental concepts, the anticipated operational conditions, and the lessons learned, let us proceed with the analysis of the Constabulary organization. It can be seen that the Constabulary Planning Group was faced with a wealth of detail in their brief month's time in which to design a new table of organization meeting all of the desired features but lacking the undesirable. Nevertheless, on 7 February 1946, their recommended Constabulary Tables of Organization and Equipment were approved by the European Theater Commander, and then speedily flown to Washington for final approval. Hence, the Constabulary was organized by virtue of the Theater Commander's authority, as approved by him.

Accordingly, let us analyze the major units of the organization as it existed on 1 July 1946, its first day of operations. (For unit designations, see Annex 1.) Starting at the top, Headquarters, United States Constabulary served as the overall controlling, coordinating and commanding echelon. (A

good comparison would be an imaginary Corps Group Headquarters or a Corps-Army level headquarters.) Special troops assigned to operate this headquarters/consisted of the normal Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Troop, a signal battalion, a military police company, a quartermaster car platoon and an air-liaison detachment. The Constabulary School Detachment located at Sonthofen operated directly under the headquarters. Another point to note at this time is that operational technical services and logistical support were excluded from the organization on the basis that normal technical and supply channels in the European Theater would suffice.

The next lower echelon comprised the three brigade headquarters, each one set up as a tactical unit headquarters. Thus, each brigade headquarters was operated by a Brigade Headquarters Troop. Each brigade headquarters commanded three regiments, which were established as administrative as well as tactical headquarters. In addition to their squadrons and the normal Regimental Headquarters Troop, each regiment was assigned a Regimental Service Troop, a Regimental Light Tank Company and a Regimental Horse Platoon. Thus, there were nine regiments, nine service troops, nine light tank companies and nine horse platoons.

Continuing, it was normal for each regimental headquarters to command three squadrons, which were actually the basic operational units of the Constabulary. Each squadron was composed of a Headquarters

Troop, three mechanized troops and two motorized troops. Consequently, on 1 July 1946, the Constabulary operationally consisted of an overall headquarters, three brigade headquarters, nine regimental headquarters, twenty-seven squadron headquarters, one hundred and five line troops, nine light tank companies and nine horse platoons. These were the units assigned as of 1 July 1946 to secure the United States Zone of Occupation (Germany).

For a complete understanding, let us examine later-recommended changes to the 1 July 1946 organization. When the War Department approved the Constabulary Tables of Organization and Equipment in March 1946, it did so tentatively and directed that Constabulary later draw up new tables based upon experience and needs discovered from actual operations. Hence, on 5 November 1946, Headquarters United States Constabulary submitted to Third US Army the desired changes and recommendations for a new table of organization. (However, these recommendations have not as yet, to my knowledge, been approved or authorized by the War Department. Hence, Constabulary is still basically operating under the original table.)

As a basis for these recommendations, certain assumptions were made. One was that the area security mission would remain in effect whereas border control was considered less permanent. Tactical and combat requirements were considered unchanged, as was the use of indigenous personnel in such work as mess maintenance and janitor service. One important assumption was that the

presently authorized personnel strength would not be materially increased.

Thus, the first major organizational change recommended was that the number of line troops per squadron be decreased from five to four and that the strength of the new troop be increased from 160 to 185. This enabled more personnel to be present for operational duty and reduced the overhead personnel in each squadron. Also, one standard Constabulary Troop was proposed in place of the former different types, mechanized and motorized. Another change involved the inclusion of a provost marshal section in all units down to and including the troop. This was important in that Constabulary operations were primarily of a police nature and required such a section in all units. Because of the extreme distance generally found between regiment and their squadrons, it was recommended that each squadron be given its own maintenance and personnel sections, at that time a part of Regimental Headquarters Troop. Still another overhead economy measure was the combination of the Regimental Headquarters Troop and the Regimental Service Troop. Inasmuch as experience indicated that the brigade headquarters be assigned such administrative sections as Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Ordnance and Public Relations, these changes were recommended. However, it was still intended that the brigade remain primarily an operational headquarters; the vast amount of work and the distances involved required the addition of

these sections to brigades if the particular functions indicated were to be carried out as required by Army standards. In short, these recommendations submitted in November 1946 complied with the original intent, namely that the Constabulary organization be suited to the occupational mission assigned.

As one last point on the organizational structure, in January 1947 the critical shortage of replacements forced the Constabulary to yield some 1200 troop spaces as its part of the overall European Theater reduction program. Thus, it was decided to inactivate all nine Regimental Light Tank Companies, effective 28 February 1947. Again, on 1 March 1947, the personnel situation became so acute that one troop ("E") of each squadron was made inoperational, to make more officers and men available for duty with the remaining four troops. It will be noted that this latter decision reduced the number of troops per squadron from five to four, as recommended in November 1946. Thus, as of 1 January 1947, to all intents and purposes the Constabulary was still operating under the 1 July 1946 Table of Organization, except as modified by the personnel shortages and requirements cited.

Inasmuch as we have seen the mission and the organizational structure provided the Constabulary, let us turn our attention to the peculiarities of the operations proper, with a view toward understanding how the Constabulary intended to accomplish the overall security of the United States Zone of Occupation (Germany). It is felt that the operational plan in effect as of 1 January 1947 offers the most appropriate crutch for understanding Constabulary inasmuch as most of the "bugs" had been worked out and corrected during the 1 July

1946-31 December 1946 period. Now then, to analyze this 1 January 1947 plan, let us break it down into three major sub-divisions:

1) the assignment of units to specific areas; 2) the overall scheme of operations; and 3) the Constabulary's relationship with other law-enforcing agencies in the zone.

However, in this discussion of operations proper, it is well initially to point out that the problems of obtaining and training personnel were tremendous obstacles to overcome. In addition, the youth and immaturity of the incoming reinforcements made matters worse. These problems confronted commanders on all echelons. On 1 July 1947, European Command (which had supplanted Hq USFET o/a 15 March 1947) theoretically put an end to these personnel strength problems as such by reducing the Constabulary's authorized strength from some 32,000 to some 18,000. This was done to bring the authorized troop strength in the European Theater more closely in line with the personnel and replacements available. Also, by so doing, it was hoped that the tremendous turn-over and serious shortages of personnel would be alleviated by operating more full-strength units as opposed to the former condition of many under-strength units. These problems are brought out at this time to emphasize a readily apparent and yet a major operational point: efficiency in operations is very seriously dependent upon available personnel.

Logically enough, the Constabulary operational plans were of necessity based upon the personnel and equipment authorized by

the Tables of Organization and Equipment. Hence, the failure or inability of higher headquarters to provide not only the expected elite personnel but even the adequate live bodies seriously complicated and hindered the Constabulary's operations. The fact was that there were just not enough people available in the troops and squadrons to accomplish the overall security mission as the Constabulary Commander desired, in spite of his (General Harmon's) persistent attempts to procure the authorized strength of officer and enlisted personnel.

Nevertheless, let us pass from this personnel problem and look into the first major point of the 1 January 1947 plan — the assignment of Constabulary units to areas of responsibility. This was greatly influenced by the existing German political boundaries. To coincide with the three German Lander (comparable with our state) the zone was divided into three Constabulary Brigade areas which were further sub-divided into Constabulary Regiment areas based on German Regierungsbezirke (somewhat similar to a group of our counties), and then still further sub-divided into Constabulary Squadron areas based on German Kreise (comparable with our counties). Although it was not practical in every case to adhere strictly to these German political boundaries, by and large the areas of responsibility coincided with the local political areas. Brigade Commanders were responsible for their assigned regiments which in turn were responsible for their assigned squadrons according to the following political or

brigade areas:

- 1st Brigade ----- Lands Greater Hesse and Baden.
- 2d Brigade ----- Land Bavaria less Regierungsbezirke Mainfranken, Obereranen, Mittelfranken and the city of Neu Ulm.
- 3d Brigade ----- Land Wurttemberg and Regierungsbezirke Mainfranken, Obereranen, Mittelfranken and the city of Neu Ulm.

It will be noted that each brigade, regiment and squadron was in turn assigned a definite area to which its activities were confined, generally speaking. Although this point is fundamental, it bears stressing: each unit commander knew exactly that such and such an area was completely his security responsibility. Hence, sense of responsibility as well as efficiency of operations were enhanced.

Another noteworthy point in this assignment of areas was the close supervision and control exercised throughout the entire area by Headquarters United States Constabulary. This was done to preclude differing interpretations and duplication of effort on operational policies among the three brigades. Although such close supervision and control seemed harsh and undue to the lower units, experience gained earlier in the occupation indicated the absolute necessity for such, if maximum efficiency was to prevail. For example, during the infantry divisions' tenure of occupation duty, the individual division commander moved organic units about his area almost at will. However, under Constabulary, the Brigade Commander (who commanded an area comparable in size to that of the former division area) was not permitted to move even a platoon without the Constabulary Commander's express approval, at least in

the initial stages of Constabulary operations. The reason for this was that each platoon, troop and other unit had been especially located on the ground in order best to accomplish the overall security program. To put the supervision and control measure briefly, the chain of command was essential to efficiency in so large an area where units were widely spread, if one and only one interpretation of policy was to prevail throughout and duplication of effort was to be avoided.

Now that we have seen the areas in which the major units were to operate, let us look at the general scheme of operations to see how the security mission was accomplished. Whereas the initial or 1 July 1946 operational plan had emphasized patrolling, the 1 January 1947 plan emphasized the location of units at or close to those areas where incident rates were high, with a view toward reduction of unnecessary patrols in rural or uneventful areas. This major difference in the two plans, six months apart, is pointed out to exemplify the key-note to General Harmon's long-range operational aspect -- constant improvement based upon experience, statistics, and trends.

The general method of Constabulary operations was, of course, directed by the mission assigned by higher headquarters. This entailed not only "an active patrol system" but measures for support of these patrols and stations, namely mobile reserves. Then again, a security mission is not an eight- or twelve-hour

matter, but a day and night affair; accordingly, to prevent the operational personnel from burning themselves out, a system of rotation was established. From time to time, large-scale operations or shows of force and search operations were necessary. Also, train guards and other such special details were constantly cropping up. Then there was always the subject of border control to dissipate troop strengths further. In other words, the Constabulary security mission was not simply one of screening a flank or outpostting a position, but rather involved a maze of peculiar tasks which taken together formed an overall security program. Consequently, to explain Constabulary operations, these peculiar tasks will each be discussed in detail.

First and foremost of the operational procedures or peculiarities was the system of patrols. A most familiar sight to the German civilian, be it in the funereal-dressed Hessian country or in the in the leather-trousered Bavarian country, was the red-yellow-blue striped Constabulary jeep carrying two or three troopers and a German policeman. But there was more to the patrol than merely a couple of yellow-scarfed troopers riding over the countryside. Each patrol represented one small part of a coordinated system conducted by regiment, which directed routes and locations for all patrols in the regimental area. In this way the entire regimental area was coordinated and controlled. In somewhat the same manner the brigades and Constabulary Headquarters followed the patrol activities of each

each regiment. Constabulary Headquarters operated a Control Room (comparable with the familiar War Room, but specializing more so in statistics and trends) where each patrol route throughout the entire zone was plotted on maps showing "high incident-rate areas" or "hot spots" such as displaced persons camps, large cities and negro unit installations. As an example of what need there was for Constabulary patrols at hot spots, in GOPPINGEN the German police who had arrested several prostitutes were forced to deliver the women to military government courts for trial because the German court was afraid of violent repercussions from the local negro soldiers who associated with the prostitutes. In short, patrols operated according to plan and necessity in an attempt to uphold general security.

Prior to explanation of patrol functions, let us look at the types of patrols, namely vehicular, horse and foot. Basically the vehicular patrol was most extensively employed. It consisted usually of two or three troopers fully armed and a local German policeman. Where range permitted, radios were used to communicate with immediate command posts; but most frequently vehicular patrols operated out of the SCR 510, 528 and later the SCR 694 radio ranges. Therefore, vehicular patrols customarily resorted to established telephone stations for their reporting. The jeep served as a rapid means of transporting these small patrols over their assigned routes and to required installations such as Counter Intelligence

C orps, Military Government and German police headquarters; and also served for normal escort, convoy and sundry police duties such as investigations. The first six months of operations proved that the jeep patrols were travelling too far over too long a time period; accordingly, a maximum distance of 60 miles was set for each jeep patrol, to enhance operational efficiency. Both interior and border patrolling were effected mainly with the jeep patrols. Road conditions, maintenance and general unserviceability rendered the armored cars unsuited for the rigorous, routine patrols.

By way of introducing the horse patrols, it is well to explain that the United States Zone is bounded on the south by the Austrian Alps and on the east by the rugged highlands of the Bohemian Forest. Hence, the horse was used primarily to enable patrols to traverse those areas of the border which proved inaccessible even to the ground-conquering 1/4 ton truck. Other uses of horses were mounted city police, escorts and ceremonies. Surprisingly enough to those who feel that the day of the military horse is past, it is felt personally that each of the regimental horse platoons was well worth its forage and keep; operationally they served their purpose and from the morale and recruiting aspect they were appealing. This latter point was by no means insignificant during a period of personnel shortages.

The third type of patrol was that of the infantry — the foot patrol, not only useful in covering stretches of the border

where the jeep and horse could not travel but primarily useful in towns, serving more or less in the role of military police.

Nevertheless, regardless of its type or mode of travel, patrol functions were essentially the same. Basically the purpose was to enforce military government policies among the German populace and to maintain security. Patrols accomplished their purpose by being alert for any and all indications of subversive activities or failure to comply with stated laws; by impressing the indigenous populace with their demeanor and bearing; and by establishing close liaison and coordination with other law-enforcing agencies such as military government, counter-intelligence corps, criminal investigation detachments and local German police. In connection with impressing the Germans with model American military behavior, Constabulary patrols inherited such additional duties as military police where such units were not available especially in locations considered to be potential security threats such as large negro service installations and troublesome displaced persons' camps. Consequently, in view of their many duties, it was considered imperative that all patrols be thoroughly briefed and inspected before departing on patrol, to insure the highest possible standards of performance.

Next let us pass to the subject of mobile reserves. It is readily recognized that a commander's reserve is perhaps his best means of influencing a particular action. Add to this the fact that

the Constabulary unit commanders' personnel were widely deployed in small numbers throughout their respective areas. Thus, it was essential that each echelon generally to include the platoon, have a mobile reserve prepared at all times to support rapidly. Headquarters United States Constabulary required each squadron to have at least two troops in reserve prepared to move on a two-hour warning; each regiment to have plans to assemble a provisional squadron "as an effective force" on a three-hour warning. Furthermore, it was provided that, should the occasion warrant, all reserves under the regimental (or brigade) commander would be made available to him on call. Whenever a particular commander employed his reserve, he immediately reported this fact to his next higher headquarters. Actually, the two troops in squadron reserve underwent training, rest, rehabilitation, maintenance and general improvement of operational procedure which would not interfere with their being ready to move out in the prescribed time if called. Monthly, and more frequently as the situation required, each Constabulary unit down to and including the squadron was required to simulate an emergency requiring employment of the reserve unit(s). Here again, the shortages of personnel and also gasoline precluded full value of an otherwise splendid opportunity not only to practise for future emergencies but to impress the German populace. Nevertheless, time and again mobile reserves proved their worth in quelling displaced persons' disorders. For example, a literal reign of terror in the

FLOSSENBURG Displaced Persons Camp was terminated when a force of approximately 400 Constabulary troopers suddenly raided the camp and restored law and order.²⁴

Closely related to the subject of reserves is that of rotation, a system similar to that used by the infantry battalion in combat, wherein part of the command undergoes rest, rehabilitation and training after a certain time spent in operations. The rotational criteria fluctuated, but as of 1 January 1947 six weeks operational and four weeks in the kaserne area was adopted for each troop. Initially some thought was given to the rotation of squadrons, but the impracticability outweighed the advantages, and hence the thought was dismissed. One distinct advantage to Constabulary troop rotation was the disciplinary correction and improvement which resulted in and around the squadron kaserne areas. While operational, for example on the Russian border, personnel of the troop were more or less removed from constant officer supervision, in that there were in most cases not sufficient company-grade officers for each platoon. Hence, added to the fact that border duty called for small units widely separated and there was a dearth of the desired elite type personnel, the most capable non-commissioned officer was generally appointed platoon leader. Needless to say, discipline suffered until the troop was assembled again under the troop commander. At one time while a particular troop of the 28th Constabulary Squadron was employed on border control, the only officer present for duty was the troop commander. Another advantage of rotation was that it did not permit a particular troop to remain

in a given locality too long at any one time, thereby enabling the personnel to become too friendly with the local populace. Although it was desirable that the trooper know the ground and the local authorities in his particular area, it was not considered wise for the trooper to become too firmly entrenched with the local frauleins and people to the point that he lost his alertness, vigilance and justice.

Continuity of operations, as pertained to rotation, was effected through a set plan whereby each incoming troop commander was required to visit personally all local tactical commanders, counter-intelligence corps agencies, military government, burgermeisters and German police heads; to check physically telephone communications to these offices; to acquaint key subordinates with patrol routes and important installations in the area; and to procure all records and data on the particular area. In this way, the knowledge gained by one troop was passed on to the relieving troop of the same squadron so that each incoming troop did not have to start from scratch in the new area. Thus, rotation enabled the Constabulary units to carry out their day and night schedules without thoroughly exhausting their personnel.

Another subject closely connected with reserves is that of the show of force. In the early operational period, the show of force was used more frequently than under the 1 January 1947 plan. Basically the show of force meant a "patrol of at least

troop strength....routed into major cities....to impress the German population...." The show of force as used initially was a carry-over from the days when combat divisions settled the restlessness and threatened disorder of the German populace by running a company or so of medium tanks through the supposedly troubled areas, with very salutary effect. Originally Constabulary employed its regimental light tank companies for this mission; but soon enough higher headquarters decided that tanks chewed up the already poor roads too badly. Then the armored cars, M-8 were used until the maintenance and parts replacement factors precluded such employment, as weighed against the value of the show of force among the then fairly tranquil German population. Consequently, the show of force was for the most part replaced by the monthly practice alert, although the latter was not specifically designed or directed to be routed into major cities.

The check and search operation is another procedure familiar to Constabulary personnel, but rather generally misunderstood by non-Constabulary people. Briefly, the check and search operation involved the searching of a particular area (such as a portion of town, a displaced persons' camp or group of houses) by troopers for the express purpose of apprehending suspects or criminals, suppressing black market activities, seizing illegal or contraband articles, or for checking individuals' identification papers in the interests of counter intelligence. A forerunner of this type of operation was

"Tallyho", conducted throughout the zone in the summer of 1945 by the combat divisions, for the purpose of confiscating contraband and apprehending wanted persons. However, as used by the Constabulary, normally at least a troop-sized unit was employed to seal-off a section of town while search parties went through the houses, room by room. Road blocks were set up to prevent possible escape of persons from the particular area being checked, interpreter and interrogation centers were established for suspicious and other apprehended persons, and the German police assisted Constabulary personnel whenever so authorized (unauthorized in the case of Jewish and Soviet-administered displaced persons camp).

Inasmuch as the search and check operation was designed to suppress crime and to apprehend criminals rather than to harass the innocent, it was deemed necessary not to permit promiscuous use of this procedure; but rather, to establish certain requirements before the normal, planned operation (as differentiated from emergency raids) was authorized. In conjunction with his being the agent responsible for overall security in the zone, the Commanding General, United States Constabulary was the final approving authority on all requests for check and search operations. However, in the case of military posts, static installations (such as UNRRA displaced persons centers or prisoner of war enclosures), and non-Constabulary military installations it was necessary that the particular non-Constabulary commander concerned concur in the request.

prior to forwarding same to Headquarters United States Constabulary. In this way, the number of normal, planned check and search operations was held to the minimum, the criterion being that they would be permitted only where it was expected that they would effect maximum positive results. However, this restriction was not the only measure taken concerning check and search operations: units were required to brief all participating troopers thoroughly, to insure the highest possible standards of discipline and conduct by all participants, and to transact their business with a firm but courteous manner. In other words, every effort was made to insure that the check and search operation was conducted properly and opportunely, without embarrassment to the American Army in the eyes of the German or displaced persons populace.

One example of a check and search operation was "Operation Camel", conducted by approximately 700 officers and men (from the 10th, 13th and 27th Constabulary Squadrons and the 820th Constabulary Military Police Company) in a surprise raid on the Uhlenen Displaced Persons Camp in BAMBERG. In the course of the operation, 114 displaced persons were detained for further interrogation and 84 finally turned over to military government for trial. As a result of the operation, \$45,000 worth of morphine, codeine, and penicillin was found, as well as Army clothing, live ammunition and a small amount of black powder.²⁴

One of the largest security raids conducted was "Operation

Duck" wherein over 1600 Constabulary officers and men searched the 15,000 inhabitants of the WILDFLECKEN Displaced Persons Camp. Military government had requested that Constabulary search this camp to locate numerous fugitives and firearms believed concealed there, as well as for evidence of cattle stolen from nearby German farms. The WILDFLECKEN camp had become a haven for criminals ranging from petty larceny violators to murderers. Inhabitants had actually been observed openly carrying sidearms inside the camp. Although the operation was not as lucrative as was anticipated, contraband such as liquor stills, pistols, a US carbine, pigs, horses and a bull were confiscated and 500 persons were detained.²⁵

Nevertheless, since security reached into many differing aspects, life in the Constabulary was not merely one of patrolling, mobile reserve, rest and rehabilitation while on rotation, shows of force or check and search operations: there were special missions constantly cropping up which required further stretching of personnel. Take the train guard mission, for example. On at least two trains, the Oriental Express and the London-Switzerland, Constabulary guards boarded at the points of entry and rode through to the points of departure, all the while checking documents of all persons attempting to mount or dismount in the United States Zone. Then again occasionally there were details necessary to guard repatriation trains carrying displaced persons back to their native

Poland, Hungary and other countries. One modification of this type was the detail to guard trains bearing selected displaced persons from the United States Zone to the Belgian coal fields for work in the mines.

Still another special detail was the occasional transfer of precious metals or art collections from the United States Zone to their rightful countries, as part of the American reparations mission. These guard details were interesting, but also a bit risky in that huge sums of money were involved. For example, in one such incident higher headquarters failed to notify Headquarters United States Constabulary of the night shipment of a million-odd dollars in silver from Frankfurt to Hungary until one hour before the particular train was scheduled to depart Frankfurt. Immediately, all Constabulary units along the Frankfurt-Wurzburg-Nurnberg-Regensberg-Passau proposed rail route were alerted to dispatch troop-sized units to each of the above rail stations and to patrol certain other spots along the route where the train might possibly be slowed down or boarded by would-be robbers. A troop from the 3rd Constabulary Regiment managed to race into the Frankfurt station in time to secure loading and departure of the train; troops from the 14th Constabulary Regiment patrolled for several hours along their sector of the rail line; a troop from the 6th Constabulary Regiment guarded the train all night in the Nurnberg station while repairs were made to freight car journals; then finally about 0200 hours on the next morning, the 11th Constabulary Regiment saw the valuable silver shipment

turned over to Hungarian guards at Passau. Interesting to the trooper from the point of being responsible for such valuable cargo, but risky inasmuch as one never was quite sure how far a lawless, hungry German or displaced person would go. In this same vein, the Constabulary trooper might have wearied of the long hours of guard and security duty, but he certainly had variety in his weariness.

The next type of operational procedure is the road block or check point. These were sites selected along highways, at railroad stations, in towns and at other points where it was desired physically to check personnel, baggage or belongings. Normally the road block or check point was manned by two or more troopers assisted whenever possible by German police who checked the German civilians. Thus, sites were usually chosen which could not be observed from too far away in order to prevent AWOL's, wanted German or displaced persons and others from evading the particular block ahead. Actually, it was learned that these road blocks and check points were more effective controls among the German and displaced person populace than the roving patrols, inasmuch as these road blocks remained in a given locality longer and thereby made their presence felt. It was not an uncommon sight, even in bitter cold weather, to come upon a long line of German-made cars and trucks on a lonely stretch of road, each awaiting his passage through the American control point ahead. Moreover, it was commonplace to see a crowd of guttural, jabbering Germans

mingling about a railroad station while several Constabulary troopers methodically checked each one for identification papers, illegal goods or censorship violations.

However, the trooper was also interested in checking American and Allied personnel at these road blocks and check points, as well as in slight variations of the latter, namely speed traps. The speed trap was instituted primarily as a safety preventive measure: too many American soldiers and vehicles were being lost through speed and reckless driving. Hence, the Constabulary was called upon to apprehend those personnel, both military and civilian, who committed traffic or speeding violations. Summary courts or commanding officers dealt with the military while local military government courts heard the civilian cases. Several amusing incidents arose out of these speed traps, one of which entailed the arrest of a major-general who had been asleep while his driver slightly exceeded the speed limit; another, the arrest of a general's daughter; and a third involved a War Department civilian who promptly appealed the case on the grounds that the Constabulary speed trap was not legally qualified. Nevertheless, legal revisions were made to existing directives and the Constabulary continued with its sanctioned speed traps in spite of one War Department civilian.

Prior to explanation of border control proper, it is believed that an international raid, comprising more or less all of the operational procedures cited, might be of interest. This

was "Operation Scotch" wherein approximately 1000 Constabulary personnel coordinated with the adjacent French gendarmerie in a surprise raid along the French-American boundary in Southern Wurttemberg. Intelligence agencies had previously noted that the towns and areas adjacent the French-American Zonal boundary were serving as probable focal points for underground activities, black market, illegal border crossing and unauthorized interzonal trade traffic. Using tanks, armored cars, jeeps, motorcycles and horses, Constabulary searched the HUBBEN, ERCKENBRECKENSWELLER and NEUFFEN areas while the French covered the area immediately west of the border. Constabulary apprehended black market operators and many Germans for illegal border crossing, and confiscated cigarettes, large quantities of cloth and elastic goods, unauthorized weapons and a large quantity of liquor.²⁶

Last of the operational procedures to be discussed is border control. Briefly, border control meant the prevention of unauthorized persons and goods from entering or leaving the American Zone. To accomplish this, a system of fixed posts and both mounted and dismounted patrols were established to check and search in the manner of a customs inspection. Moreover, these posts and patrols were coordinated with both the German rural and the German customs police. However, it was learned that borders could not be controlled efficiently merely by operating fixed posts and patrols along the border line proper: too many unauthorized persons infiltrated.

Therefore, to apprehend these illegal border crossers, a system of vigorous mounted patrolling was instituted within a zone ten miles wide extending along the overall border. This proved much more efficient.

Nonetheless, at best border control was difficult. Small detachments were necessarily garrisoned at the particular crossing points. Not only personnel and vehicles had to be checked, but trains as well. An illustrative example typical of peculiar conditions met in occupying a foreign country is this one encountered on the Czechoslovakian border: inasmuch as the locomotives used on the rail line were not from a halt capable of ascending a long grade directly east of the United States boundary, the Constabulary troopers had to mount and dismount the train as it rolled along. Needless to say, this unsatisfactory situation was corrected in time. Another condition met almost regularly for a period was that of Russian border guards firing at troopers as they patrolled their sectors. To offset this as possible misunderstanding, a system of marking the border with colored poles was installed, with ~~the~~ the Americans providing most of the work and effort; and also, the liaison with the Russians was improved. However, it was not uncommon to learn that Russian soldiers had infiltrated our border, raped and plundered German women and homes, and safely disappeared across the border again. In another border situation, a dead Russian soldier found by one of the Constabulary border patrols almost caused an international

incident: the Russian authorities refused to accept him for burial because they considered him a deserter. Here again the situation was finally solved, in time.

Of constant interest, amusing or otherwise, were rumors gleaned from Germans usually living along the Russian border.

"A force of 25,000 Russian soldiers, consisting of infantry and armored troops, have moved up within 58 Kilometers of the 81st Constabulary Squadron's border. The exact point is unknown." 27

"LAUTERBACH. Russians attacked Constabulary in the vicinity of VACHA on 8 December 1946, but were thrown back. 3rd Constabulary Regiment responded by sending 48 tanks to the border." 28

"COBURG. Constabulary troops are preparing to leave COBURG so that infantry troops may take up strategic positions in preparation for the coming war." 29

Other complications encountered on border control included provision for mobile reserves ready to support when necessary; communications not only with parent units, but with German police as well; administration and supply of these small detachments in all seasons of the year; suitable housing and sanitary facilities; and the ever-present problem of insufficient company-grade officers and high type non-commissioned officers to command these outposts and and patrols. In short, border control was not only difficult to

set up and execute, but exasperating and frustrating to an already over-extended Constabulary personnel situation.

The next major operational point to consider in the 1 January 1947 plan is the Constabulary's relationship with other law-enforcing agencies operating in the zone. Although Constabulary was the agency chiefly responsible for the overall security in the zone, agencies such as the tactical troops, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Criminal Investigation Division, the military police, the German police and the military government had their own specific law-enforcement duties to perform. Hence, Constabulary came into contact daily with these organizations. In general, to effect a smooth-working, closely-knit overall security program, Constabulary offered as much cooperation and assistance as was possible to these other agencies, but did not do their work. To explain this point, let us look into Constabulary's way of solving this coordination problem with each of the other law-enforcing agencies.

Generally speaking, there were three means employed in the zone to effect coordination and cooperation among the law-enforcing agencies. First of these was the coordination and cooperation enacted on the ground by the local commanders and officials concerned. Actually, this was generally very satisfactory in that the local commanders appreciated each other's problems and could thus come to agreeable conclusions without too much delay or harassment, at least on minor problems. Secondly, there was the monthly Security and Liaison

Conference held at Headquarters United States Constabulary so that representatives of all law-enforcing agencies might commonly discuss matters pertaining to security and coordination in the zone. These conferences were beneficial in that high commanders and/or staff officers usually attended; but too often it seemed that the Constabulary alone was taking full advantage of the excellent opportunity offered by this conference. With the Constabulary Commander, it was customary to draw up studies of all pertinent problems affecting operations of the past month as well as of future operations, and to present these matters to the assembled representatives for discussion and solution. However, such was not the case with all other agencies concerned. The last of the means employed for coordination and cooperation was the overall security plan drawn up under the guidance of the Constabulary Commander. This plan was nothing more than the customary operational plan, but modified to meet the dictates of the occupational security mission. It is believed that this plan was highly beneficial and significant in that it coordinated the operational efforts of American personnel in the zone in event of emergency — a most important consideration for units occupying a foreign, former belligerent country during a period of international confusion.

Specifically, the Constabulary was directed by General Harmon to maintain close relations and to cooperate fully with each of the other law-enforcing agencies, but not to undertake or to interfere with their functions. For example, troopers were not to serve

as German police, but they were to assist and cooperate when the German police were unable to cope with a given situation. Customarily this assistance was effected through military government offices inasmuch as the German police operated under military government; but in an emergency local Constabulary units were contacted directly by the German police and military government notified as soon as possible of the particular incident. This assistance and cooperation not only improved the immediate security in the zone, but also raised the prestige of the German police in the eyes of his force-loving countrymen, thereby serving as a strengthening factor in the reestablishment of the police system in Germany. As regards the American law-enforcing agencies, Constabulary not only supported but protected military government installations; Constabulary supported and reinforced military police units; Constabulary exchanged information with and assisted both Counter Intelligence Corps and Criminal Investigation Division, to the mutual benefit of all parties. In brief, the strong right arm (the Constabulary) had to know what the left hand (the other agencies in the zone) was doing; and likewise, unless both hands worked toward a common good with a common understanding, the success of the occupation would suffer.

In conclusion then, this paper has discussed the major points considered essential for a general understanding of the United States Constabulary's operations in the occupation of

Germany. In a hectic post-war period, the Army designed the Constabulary as its solution to the permanent, long-term occupation problem and assigned to the Constabulary a mission of general military and civil security. Organized as an economical police type force along mechanized cavalry lines, the Constabulary trained, patrolled, searched and blocked in its sincere and energetic effort to report daily, "mission accomplished". The work was long and demanded much from the trooper. The personnel situation was critical both in quality and in quantity. But, the mission was accomplished: the zone was secured. A bastard unit assigned to a bastard mission, the Constabulary can well afford to hold its young head high, proud of its occupational record during a difficult period in Europe.

ANNEX 1

CONSTABULARY UNITS

Original Designation

Constabulary Designation

Hq & Hq Co. VI Corps

Hq & Hq Troop, US Const-
abulary.

Hq & Hq Co. 4th Armored Division

Hq & Hq Troop, 1st Const-
abulary Brigade.

Hq & Hq Co. Combat Command "A",
4th Armored Division

Hq & Hq Troop, 2nd Const-
abulary Brigade.

Hq & Hq Co. Combat Command "B",
4th Armored Division

Hq & Hq Troop, 3rd Const-
abulary Brigade.

1ST CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Co. 11th
Armored Group

Hq & Hq Troop, 1st Const-
abulary Regiment

11th Armored Infantry
Battalion. 1st Armored Division

11th Constabulary Squadron

6th Armored Infantry
Battalion. 1st Armored Division

12th Constabulary Squadron

91st Armored Field
Artillery Battalion. 1st Armored
Division

91st Constabulary Squadron

2ND CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 2nd Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop, 2nd Const-
abulary Regiment

2nd Mechanized Cavalry
Squadron (Separate)

2nd Constabulary Squadron

42nd Mechanized Cavalry
Squadron (Separate)

42nd Constabulary Squadron

66th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion. 4th Armored
Division

66th Constabulary Squadron

3RD CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Co. Combat Command "A",
1st Armored Division

Hq & Hq Troop 3rd Const-
abulary Regiment

37th Tank Battalion
4th Armored Division

37th Constabulary Squadron

68th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion. 1st Armored Division

68th Constabulary Squadron

81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
(Mechanized) 1st Armored Division

81st Constabulary Squadron

5TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Co. 6th Tank
Destroyer Group

Hq & Hq Troop 5th Const-
abulary Regiment

8th Tank Battalion
4th Armored Division

8th Constabulary Squadron

35th Tank Battalion
4th Armored Division

35th Constabulary Squadron

474th Anti Aircraft Automatic
Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)

74th Constabulary Squadron

6TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 6th Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop 6th Const-
abulary Regiment

6th Mechanized Cavalry
Squadron (Separate)

6th Constabulary Squadron

53rd Armored Infantry Battalion
4th Armored Division

53rd Constabulary Squadron

11TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 11th Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop, 11th Const-
abulary Regiment

25th Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron 4th Armored Division 25th Constabulary Squadron

94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 4th Armored Division 94th Constabulary Squadron

51st Armored Infantry Battalion 4th Armored Division 51st Constabulary Squadron

14TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 14th Cavalry Group (Mechanized) Hq & Hq Troop, 14th Constabulary Regiment

10th Armored Infantry Battalion 4th Armored Division 10th Constabulary Squadron

22nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion 4th Armored Division 22nd Constabulary Squadron

27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 1st Armored Division 27th Constabulary Squadron

15TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 15th Cavalry Group (Mechanized) Hq & Hq Troop, 15th Constabulary Regiment

15th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Separate) 15th Constabulary Squadron

1st Tank Battalion 1st Armored Division 1st Constabulary Squadron

14th Armored Infantry Battalion 1st Armored Division 14th Constabulary Squadron

SPECIAL TROOPS US CONSTABULARY

97th Signal Battalion 97th Constabulary Signal Squadron

465th Anti Aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) Constabulary School Squadron


FOOTNOTES


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U.S. ZONE GERMANY

